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Understanding the Initial
Guidance on the
Executive Compensation Rules
under the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA)
The Treasury Department has
issued interim guidance on the executive compensation rules
enacted in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
(EESA), including guidance from the Internal Revenue Service
(I.R.S.).
Tax Rules –
EESA § 302: The I.R.S. released
Notice 2008-94
with guidance on new Sections 162(m)(5) and 280G(e) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (I.R.C.) (together,
the "Tax Rules") limiting deductions, respectively, for
compensation over $500,000 and excessive severance, but in each case
only if paid to applicable senior executives by a financial institution that
sells more than $300 million in "troubled assets" under EESA's
Troubled Assets Relief Program (the "TARP") where one
or more troubled assets are sold through a trouble asset auction
program ("TAAP").
The Tax Rules do not apply to financial institutions that do
not sell troubled assets in an EESA TAAP,
though some terms defined in the Tax Rules are referenced
elsewhere in the interim guidance under TARP.
Section
I of this Alert describes the guidance provided under the
Tax Rules and notes how they differ from the rules under the Treasury's other interim guidance
under TARP.
Capital
Purchase Program (CPP)[4]
– EESA §§111(b)
The Treasury issued interim
final regulations (the "TARP CPP Regs.") under EESA Section 111(b)
for participants in the CPP, a TARP direct purchase program pursuant to which the
Treasury will purchase senior preferred stock of financial
institution issuers in order to increase liquidity in the capital
markets.
Section II of this Alert describes the interim guidance in the
TARP CPP Regs on the executive compensation rules applicable in
a CPP.
Trouble Asset
Auction Program (TAAP)[6] – EESA §§ 111(a) and (c).
The Treasury issued
Notice
2008-TAAP
with guidance on the
restriction imposed on certain financial institutions from
entering into new employment contracts with golden parachute
severance provisions under EESA Section
111(c).
Section 111(c) applies to
financial institutions from which one or more troubled assets
are acquired through the TAAP, but only if the aggregate amount
of troubled assets acquired (including through TARP direct purchases) exceed
$300 million.
Notice
2008-TAAP will apply to taxpayers subject to the Tax Rules, but
not to financial institutions who participate
only in
direct purchases under the TARP, including the CPP.
Section III of this Alert describes the restriction on parachute
payments applicable to certain financial institutions that
participate in a TAAP.
Program for
Systemically Significant Failing Institutions (PSSFI) – EESA
§111. The Treasury issued Notice
2008-PSSFI indicating that
it is developing a third program to provide assistance directly
to Systemically
Significant Failing Institutions. The executive compensation
guidance in Notice 2008-PSSFI is, in essence, a combination of
the rules restricting new golden parachute arrangements (under
Notice 2008-TAAP)
and the executive compensation
rules applicable to the CPP (under
the TARP CPP Regs.) except that
for purposes of the PSSFI, prohibited "golden parachute payments"
will encompass all payments in the nature of compensation
to or for the benefit of any covered executive, other than
payments under qualified retirement arrangements, in respect of an applicable severance from employment.
Note on
CPP Participation: Financial institutions that
participate only in the CPP or whose total TARP
sales exceed $300 million but do not include any
TAAP sales, will not be subject to the Tax Rules or to Notice
2008-TAAP. While the Treasury guidance
regarding executive compensation applicable to participants in the CPP (as
well as to that applicable to the
TAAP and PSSFI programs) reference some of the Tax Rules
definitions,
these executive compensation rules vary from the
Tax Rules, especially in the event of an acquisition of
financial institutions to whom the Tax Rules are otherwise
applicable.
- IRS Guidance on Tax Rules for Deduction Limits on Compensation and Golden Parachute Severance
-
$500,000
Compensation Deduction Cap --New Section 162(m)(5)
Scope. New I.R.C. §
162(m)(5) limits the deduction
for "executive remuneration" and "deferred deduction executive
remuneration" paid to a "covered executive" of an "applicable
employer"
to $500,000 during "applicable taxable years." These key terms
are explained below. A substantially similar standard
is required to be agreed to by a financial institution as a
condition to participation in the CPP.
Key
differences from existing I.R.C. § 162(m). While the new provision tracks the general rule of I.R.C.
§
162(m) that limits the deduction
for a covered executive's compensation to $1 million, the new
law is not limited to public companies or to corporations. In
addition, the exception for performance-based compensation and
certain other exceptions to the $1 million deduction cap do
not apply to those subject to the new rule.
Note:
Application in the CPP.
While new I.R.C.
§
162(m)(5) does not apply
directly to financial institutions participating only in a TARP
direct purchase program like the CPP, the terms of those programs require the
financial institution to agree not to claim a deduction in
excess of $500,000 for compensation paid to the five senior
executive officers, as the term is defined in the TARP CPP Regs.
Who Is An Applicable Employer?
An "applicable employer" is any
financial institution selling more than $300 million in troubled
assets under the TARP (excluding financial institutions that
sell troubled assets only through direct purchases).
Troubled assets sold under the TARP by a target financial
institution prior to its acquisition by an unrelated financial
institution, however, are not aggregated with any assets sold by
the acquirer prior to or after the acquisition.
What About Non-Public Companies?
A non-public company can be an
applicable employer, without regard to the form of the entity,
which is not the case under I.R.C.
§
162(m) generally.
How Are Companies with Common Ownership or in a Controlled Group
Treated?
Two or more persons will be
treated as a single "applicable employer" applying the same
rules used for qualified retirement plan purposes, i.e.,
whether they are part of a controlled group of corporations
or under common control.
Bank Holding Company Example.
The Notice provides
the example of a bank holding company that is the sole owner of
three banks that individually sell $100 million or more in the
TARP auctions over a year, that aggregate over $300 million,
constitutes a single applicable employer with the three banks
that has sold in excess of $300 million of troubled assets and,
thus, the chief executive officer and chief financial officer of
the bank holding company and the three other most highly
compensated officers of the bank holding company controlled
group are each "covered executives."
Partnerships, Trusts, Etc.
Determining whether more than $300 million of troubled assets
have been sold is made at the level of the selling entity taking
into account all entities that are treated as the same employer
under the controlled group rules, as noted. If the selling
entity has no employees who are officers (or acting in the
capacity of an officer), then the owner of the entity that
manages the selling entity's assets is the entity
that may be the applicable employer together with any others in
the controlled group.
NOTE:
The TARP CPP Regs. also
reference the same existing tax rules for purposes of
determining if financial institutions are part of the same
control group for purposes of EESA
§ 111(b).
What Constitutes Executive Remuneration For An Applicable Year?
The limitation applies to "executive
remuneration" and to "deferred deduction executive
remuneration," which terms cover compensation for services
rendered in any applicable taxable year that are
otherwise deductible (a) in the current taxable year (i.e.,
whether or not paid currently)
or (b) in any subsequent year if attributable to any applicable
taxable year. The deduction for the deferred amount paid in the
later year is limited if the sum of the earlier year deductible
payment, when added to the deferred amount, exceeds $500,000.
Any earnings on the deferred amount are treated as part of the
deferred remuneration.
Remuneration Spanning More Than a Year.
To determine when compensation is attributable to any formula
any particular year, in the first instance one looks to any
formula under an applicable plan or arrangement provided the
executive has a legally binding right to the remuneration.
If the payment can be reduced unilaterally by the employer after
the services have been performed, it is not subject to a legally
binding right unless the reduction requires a condition or the
discretion lacks substance.
At
Risk
Pay. If the executive's right is
subject to an obligation to perform substantial future services,
and as a consequence is subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture, the remuneration is deemed earned over the
applicable period on a pro rata basis, absent formula in a plan
or pursuant to a legally binding right, as noted above.
How Are The Applicable Tax Years Determined?
The $500,000 cap applies in the
first taxable year in which the employer has sold an aggregate
of more than $300 million in troubled assets under the TARP,
including sales in prior years (unless all sales were through
direct purchases). Each subsequent year while the TARP
authority is outstanding
is an applicable tax year, and, in the case of the so-called
"deferred deduction executive compensation" the limitation can
apply to later years.
The limit with respect to deferred deduction executive
remuneration for services performed in an applicable taxable
year applies for deductions in all subsequent taxable years
(until the deferred deduction executive remuneration for
services performed in that applicable taxable year is completely
paid).
The applicable tax year is the year of the parent entity in the
case of a controlled group.
Who Are Covered Executives?
Under the Tax Rules, the term
"covered executive" means (i) the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) (or an individual acting
in either of those capacities) of the applicable employer and
(ii) the three highest compensated officers of the applicable
employer (including the entire controlled group) other than the
CEO or CFO, in each case taking into account only individuals
employed during the taxable year that includes any portion of
the TARP authorities period. For a public company subject to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), the
determination of the three highest compensated officers is
determined under the shareholder disclosure rules, except that
the measurement period for purposes of determining the high
three officers for an applicable taxable year is that taxable
year and not total compensation for the last completed fiscal
year as under the Exchange Act rules. For private employers and
noncorporate entities, rules analogous to the Exchange Act
disclosure rules are to be applied.
[31]
NOTE:
Under the Tax Rules, once an employee is a covered
executive for any applicable taxable year, the executive is a
covered executive for all subsequent applicable taxable years.
If the financial institution is acquired, the acquirer will not
automatically become an applicable employer; however, if the
target was an applicable employer at the time, a covered
executive of the target will continue to be a covered executive
for the rest of the TARP authorities period if employed by the
controlled group of which target is a member, regardless
of whether acquirer is an applicable employer and regardless
of whether the target covered executive is a covered executive
of the acquirer. Post-acquisition, no new executives of target
will be a covered executive merely because of such termination,
unless he or she is a covered executive of acquirer.
NOTE:
Unlike the Tax Rules, the TARP
CPP Regs. use the term "senior executive officers" (the "SEOs")
of financial institutions in applying the restrictions imposed
under EESA § 111. See discussion in Section II below.
-
"Golden
Parachute" Severance Deduction Cap -
New Section 280G(e)
[33]
Prior to amendment by EESA § 302(b),
I.R.C. §
280G denied a deduction for
"excess parachute payments" made to any executive and imposed a
20% excise tax of such amount on the executive under I.R.C. §
4999, where such payments were
conditioned on a change in control of the employer. New I.R.C. § 280G(e) expands the definition
of a "parachute
payment" to include severance payments made to a covered executive of an
applicable employer participating in the TARP. The terms
"applicable employer," "applicable taxable year" and "covered
executive" have the same meaning as in new I.R.C.
§
162(m)(5) imposing the $500,000
compensation deduction limit, discussed above in Section I.A of
this Alert. New I.R.C. §
280G(e) is effective for
applicable severance payments made during an applicable taxable
year with respect to severances, but only if occurring during the TARP
authorities period.
What Is An "Involuntary Termination?"
The term "applicable severance"
is any severance from employment of a covered executive by
reason of an involuntary termination of the executive by the
employer or in connection with a bankruptcy, liquidation, or
receivership of the employer.[35]
An "involuntary termination" results from the independent
exercise of unilateral authority to terminate services, other
than due to the covered executive's implicit or explicit
request, where the covered executive was willing and able to
continue performing services.
An involuntary termination may include failure to renew a
contract if the covered executive was willing and able to
execute a new one on substantially similar terms, and can
include a termination for good reason due to a material negative
change in the covered executive's employment relationship.
An involuntary termination can exist even when the covered
executive has voluntarily terminated, if the facts and
circumstances indicate that the executive was aware that he or
she would have been terminated involuntarily.
What Constitutes An "Excess Parachute Payment" For Purposes Of §
280G(e)?
A "parachute payment" means any
payment in the nature of compensation to or for the benefit of a
covered executive if the aggregate present value of such
payments equals or exceeds an amount equal to 3 times the
covered executive's base amount. An "excess parachute payment"
is any parachute payment in excess of the base amount.
Put simply, the base
amount is the five year average of the executive's W-2
compensation from the applicable employer.
The payment must be made during an applicable taxable year on
account of an applicable severance from employment during the
TARP authorities period.
The payment must not have been payable even if no applicable
severance from employment had occurred (including amounts that
would otherwise have been forfeited due to severance from
employment and amounts that are accelerated on account of the
applicable severance from employment).
But amounts paid to a covered executive under a tax-qualified
retirement plan are not payments for this purpose.
It is important to recognize that for this purpose, a payment on
account of an applicable severance from employment includes
amounts that are accelerated as a result of the applicable
severance from employment applying the same rules presently used
under Section 280G generally.
What Are The Consequences Of An Excess Parachute Payment?
No deduction is allowed for the
excess parachute payment and an excise tax equal to 20% of the
excess parachute payment is imposed on the covered executive.
What If An Applicable Severance Payment Under Section 280G(e) Is
Also A Change In Control Parachute Payment Under Section 280G?
The Tax Rules provide that if a
payment treated as a parachute payment under new I.R.C.
§
280G(e) is also a parachute
payment under existing Section 280G on account of a change in
control, then new rules do not apply to the payment.
NOTE:
Notwithstanding the foregoing
provision in the Tax Rules, in the case of covered executives
of a financial institution participating in a direct
purchase program (including the CPP and the PSSFI) subject to EESA
§ 111(b) that is acquired during the TARP
authorities period while the Treasury has debt or equity
securities of the financial institution, the restriction on
parachute payments in the case of the CPP (and on severance
payments generally under the PSSFI) will continue
to apply to the covered executives for one year
following the acquisition without regard to whether or not the
executive is an SEO of the acquirer. This suggests that Section 280G(e)
also will apply in the event of an applicable severance of
employment, rather than Section 280G without regard to Section
280G(e).
See discussion in Section II, below.
- TARP
Capital Purchase Program (CPP)
-
New Bank Equity Purchases to
Strengthen Capital Structures to Facilitate Lending in the
Capital Market
The CPP provides the
standardized terms under which equity capital is to be provided
directly to financial institutions. Under the TARP CPP Regs.,
as a condition to participating in the CPP, the financial
institution must become subject to more stringent executive
compensation rules in respect of its senior executive officers
(SEOs) during the time the Treasury holds equity
or debt securities of the issuer. A term sheet for the Senior
Preferred Stock to be purchased was released together with the
announcement of the terms of the program.
-
CPP Executive Compensation
Rules
The TARP CPP Regs. provide that
a participating financial institution must meet certain
executive compensation standards with respect to its SEOs,
including the following while the Treasury holds an equity or
debt position in the financial institution acquired under the
CPP:
-
Inappropriate Risk Incentives
To ensure that incentive
compensation for senior executives does not encourage
unnecessary and excessive risks, including both long-term as
well as short-term risks that threaten the value of the
financial institution, the TARP CPP Regs. require that:
(1) within 90 days after a
direct purchase under the CPP, the compensation or similar
committee must review the SEO incentive compensation
arrangements with the financial institution's senior risk
officers, or other personnel acting in a similar capacity;
(2) thereafter, such committee
must meet at least annually with such risk personnel to review
the relationship between the financial institution's risk
management policies and practices and the SEO incentive
compensation arrangements; and
(3) such committee must
certify
that it has completed the reviews required by (1) and (2) above,
and should identify and limit any features in the SEO incentive
arrangements to ensure that the SEOs are not encouraged to take
risks that are unnecessary or excessive.
-
Clawback of Bonus/Incentive Compensation[52]
The TARP CPP Regs. require
a clawback of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to a SEO
based on financial statements or any other performance metric
criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate.
The TARP CPP
Regs. note that this requirement differs from Section 304 of
Sarbanes-Oxley[53]
in that it extends to the three most highly compensated
executive officers in addition to the CEO and CFO; applies to
both public and private financial institutions; is not
exclusively triggered by an accounting restatement; does not
limit the recovery period, and covers not only material
inaccuracies relating to financial reporting, but also material
inaccuracies relating to other performance metrics used to award
bonuses and incentive compensation.
-
No Parachute Payments[54]
The
TARP CPP Regs. prohibit making any golden parachute payment to a
senior executive.
Note that this
is the only provision in the legislation that actually prohibits
a payment to a senior executive; the others impose a penalty,
largely on the financial institution.
The
TARP CPP Regs. cross reference the definition of "golden
parachute payment" under the Tax Rules, and other terms are
substantially identical to the Tax Rules,
except that the payments at issue are only payments to SEOs and
only those during the time the Treasury owns debt or equity
securities acquired under the CPP and not for the TARP
authorities period. Note that in determining whether a
parachute payment is payable, the acceleration rules applicable
to Section 280G generally are applicable, which can result in a
parachute payment even where cash severance would not exceed 3
times the SEO's base amount.
Special Rules in Merger and Acquisition Transactions.
If a financial
institution (target) that had participated in the CPP is
acquired by an unrelated entity (acquirer) in any form, the
acquirer is not subject to these provisions (i.e., EESA §111(b)) merely as a result of the acquisition.[57] However, the TARP CPP
Regs. provide that any SEOs of target prior to the acquisition
continues to be subject to EESA § 111(b)(2)(C) (restriction on
new golden parachute agreements) until after the first
anniversary of the acquisition.
Deferred Payment May Be Permitted: While the interim guidance does not directly address the issue,
the prohibition would not appear to extend to "payments"
deferred to a period after the Treasury no longer holds the
securities. The terms of any deferral would have to be
drafted with care, especially to the extent the parachute
payment results from the acceleration of amounts not otherwise
payable at the time of termination or if a tax gross up might
become applicable at the future date.
-
Foregoing
Deduction for SEO Compensation Over $500,000
The TARP CPP Regs. also
impose a requirement that the financial institution agree not to
take a tax deduction for executive compensation in excess of
$500,000 for each SEO, without regard to whether the financial
institution is subject to the Tax Rules, which do not apply if
the financial institution is involved solely in direct purchases
of troubled assets.
This
condition is not
required by the EESA, but is imposed under the regulations. It
applies only while the Treasury holds an equity or debt position
in the financial institution acquired under the CPP and the
dollar limitation and the remuneration for the taxable year are
prorated for the portion of the taxable year that the Treasury
holds an equity or debt position in the financial institution
under the CPP.
-
CPP
Closing
Conditions on Executive Compensation
The
term sheet released
by the Treasury describing the Senior Preferred Stock and
Warrants requires as a condition to the closing of a CPP, that
the financial institution and its SEOs must modify or terminate
all benefit plans, arrangements and agreements (including golden
parachute agreements) to the extent necessary to be in
compliance with these terms following the closing and for so
long as the Treasury holds any of the financial institution’s
equity or debt securities. As an additional condition to
closing, they must also grant the Treasury a waiver releasing
the Treasury from any claims that they may otherwise have as a result
of the issuance of any regulations which modify the terms of
benefits plans, arrangements and agreements to eliminate any
provisions that would not be in compliance with the executive
compensation and corporate governance requirements of EESA § 111
and any related guidance or regulations issued on or prior to
the date of the CPP investment.
For a Day Pitney
Alert describing the TARP CPP and related application process,
which must be completed by November 14, 2008,
click
here.
-
Restrictions on New Golden Parachutes – EESA
§
111(c)
The Treasury's interim guidance
in Notice 2008-TAAP sets out the manner in which EESA
§ 111(c) prohibition on new
golden parachute agreements is to be applied in the case of
financial institutions from which one or more troubled assets
are acquired through the Troubled Assets Auction Program (TAAP),
but only where the aggregate amount of assets acquired
(including through direct purchases) exceed $300 million. The
prohibition, thus, applies to any financial institution subject to the
Tax Rules. The notice uses substantially the same definitions, though
largely
without cross reference to the Tax Rules.
What
is a "new" contract? Notice 2008-TAAP defines a
"new employment contract" to include any material compensatory
contract (including any plan, agreement, or arrangement, whether
or not written) entered into on or after the date when EESA §
111(c) applies to the financial institution.
For this purpose, if a contract is materially modified, it is
treated as a new contract and a contract is materially modified
if it increases the amount of compensation, accelerates the date
vesting occurs, or accelerates payments, applying existing rules
in regulations under I.R.S. Section 162(m).
-
Program for Systemically Significant Failing Institutions
(PSSFI) – EESA
§ 111
The Treasury's
interim guidance in Notice 2008-PSSFI
sets out the manner in which the executive compensation rules of
EESA § 111 will be applied to a new direct purchase program
still being developed to be called
Program for Systemically Significant Failing Institutions
(PSSFI). The executive compensation guidance in Notice
2008-PSSFI combines of the rules restricting new golden
parachute arrangements discussed in Section III of this Alert
(Notice 2008-TAAP ) and the executive compensation rules
applicable to the CPP discussed in Section II of this Alert
(TARP CPP Regs) except that for purposes of PSSFI, prohibited
"golden parachute payments" encompass all payments
in the nature of compensation to or for the benefit of any
covered executive other than payments under qualified retirement
arrangements.
NOTE:
To
the extent all severance-related payments are prohibited under the
PSSFI, this would be a more stringent rule than provided for in
current FDIC regulations for troubled banks, which prohibit a
troubled holding company, bank or thrift from making golden
parachute payments, though they include an exception for
severance payments upon involuntary termination and change of
control where the payment does not exceed 12 months
salary. [66]
*
* *
further
Notice 2008-94 at Q&A-13, -14 and -15. The "base
amount" for a covered executive has the same meaning set
forth in I.R.C. § 280G(b)(3) and Treas. Reg. § 1.280G-1
and Q&A-34, except that references to "change in
ownership or control" are treated as referring to an
"applicable severance from employment." Put simply, the
base amount is the five year average of the executive's
W-2 compensation from the applicable employer. The limit
imposed by new I.R.C. § 280G(e) only applies to
remuneration paid in an applicable taxable year,
determined in the same manner as under new I.R.C. §
162(m)(e). Notice 2008-94, Q&A-17. See supra
discussion in notes
28-30.
An
SEO means a "named executive officer" as defined in Item
402, Regulation S-K (17 C.F.R. § 229.402) and "executive
officer" has the meaning in Exchange Act Rule 3b-7 (17
C.F.R. § 240.3b-7). The terms Principal Executive
Officer (PEO) and Principal Financial
Officer (PFO) have replaced CEO and CFO. For the three
most highly compensated executive officers, the TARP CPP
Regs. state that "until the compensation data for the
current fiscal year are available, the financial
institution should make its best efforts to identify the
three most highly compensated executive officers for the
current fiscal year." Analogous rules to the Exchange
Act rules are to apply to financial institutions that
are not subject to the federal securities laws. TARP CPP
Regs., supra note 5 , at Q&A-2(a) and (b).
Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(Sarbanes-Oxley) (Pub. Law No. 107-204), requires the
forfeiture by a public company CEO and CFO of certain
amounts any bonus, incentive-based compensation, or
equity-based compensation received and any profits from
sales of the company's securities earned during the
twelve-month period following a materially non-compliant
financial report.
Notice 2008-TAAP at Q&A-4. For this purpose, a contract
that is renewed is treated as entered into on the date
of the renewal to the extent provided in Treas. Reg. §
1.162-27(h)(1)(i).
Id. For this purpose, Treas. Reg. §
1.162-27(h)(1)(iii)(A) and (B) apply for purposes of
determining what constitutes a material modification.
Notice 2008-PSSFI,
supra note 8.
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